Philosophical Psychology:1-25 (forthcoming)

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Abstract
Moral intuitions are generally understood as automatic strong responses to moral facts. In this paper, I offer a metacognitive account according to which the strength of moral intuitions denotes the level of confidence of a subject. Confidence is a metacognitive appraisal of the fluency with which a subject processes information from a morally salient stimulus. I show that this account is supported by some empirical evidence, explains the main features of moral intuition, and is preferable to emotional or quasi-perceptual views of moral intuition.
Keywords moral intuition  metacognition  intuitive strength
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2022.2027356
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References found in this work BETA

Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition Advancing the Debate.Jonathan Evans & Keith E. Stanovich - 2013 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3):223-241.
The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.

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Citations of this work BETA

Are Moral Intuitions Intellectual Perceptions?Dario Cecchini - 2022 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 13 (1):31-40.

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