Fallibilism, Verisimilitude, and the Preface Paradox

Erkenntnis 82 (1):169-183 (2017)
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Abstract

The Preface Paradox apparently shows that it is sometimes rational to believe logically incompatible propositions. In this paper, I propose a way out of the paradox based on the ideas of fallibilism and verisimilitude. More precisely, I defend the view that a rational inquirer can fallibly believe or accept a proposition which is false, or likely false, but verisimilar; and I argue that this view makes the Preface Paradox disappear. Some possible objections to my proposal, and an alternative view of fallible belief, are briefly discussed in the final part of the paper.

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Author's Profile

Gustavo Cevolani
IMT School For Advanced Studies Lucca

References found in this work

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
Betting on Theories.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
Critical scientific realism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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