Why Care About Non-Natural Reasons?

American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):125-134 (2019)

Authors
Richard Y. Chappell
University of Miami
Abstract
Are non-natural properties worth caring about? I consider two objections to metaethical non-naturalism. According to the intelligibility objection, it would be positively unintelligible to care about non-natural properties that float free from the causal fabric of the cosmos. According to the ethical idlers objection, there is no compelling motivation to posit non-natural normative properties because the natural properties suffice to provide us with reasons. In both cases, I argue, the objection stems from misunderstanding the role that non-natural properties play in the non-naturalist's understanding of normativity. The role of non-natural properties is not to be responded to, but to "mark" which natural properties it is correct for us to respond to in certain ways.
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking How to Live.D. O. Brink - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):267-272.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.

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Citations of this work BETA

XV—Normative Non-Naturalism and the Problem of Authority.Shamik Dasgupta - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):297-319.
A Dilemma for Non-Naturalists: Irrationality or Immorality?Matthew S. Bedke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1027-1042.

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