A not-so-simple view of intentional action

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):1–16 (1999)
Authors
David K. Chan
University of Wisconsin, Steven's Point
Abstract
The Simple View (SV) holds that for someone to intentionally A, he must intend to A. Critics of SV point to intentional actions which, due to belief-conditions or consistency constraints, agents cannot intend. By recognizing species of intention which vary according to the agent's confidence in acting, I argue that the stringency of consistency constraints depends on the agent's confidence. A more sophisticated SV holds that the species of intending is related to the degree of intentionality of the action. Finally, I show that where agents do what they believe impossible, without intending to do so, the action is not intentional.
Keywords Intention  Intentional action  Belief  Bratman  Simple View
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00070
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