Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):1–16 (1999)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
The Simple View (SV) holds that for someone to intentionally A, he must intend to A. Critics of SV point to intentional actions which, due to belief-conditions or consistency constraints, agents cannot intend. By recognizing species of intention which vary according to the agent's confidence in acting, I argue that the stringency of consistency constraints depends on the agent's confidence. A more sophisticated SV holds that the species of intending is related to the degree of intentionality of the action. Finally, I show that where agents do what they believe impossible, without intending to do so, the action is not intentional.
|
Keywords | Intention Intentional action Belief Bratman Simple View |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/1468-0114.00070 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Collective Intentional Behavior From the Standpoint of Semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
Mental Overpopulation and Mental Action: Protecting Intentions From Mental Birth Control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):49-65.
Rational Norms for Degreed Intention (and the Discrepancy Between Theoretical and Practical Reason).Jay Jian - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
Similar books and articles
Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View.Steve Matthews - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (2):183-208.
Intentional Action and the Unintentional Fallacy.Ryan Wasserman - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):524-534.
Folk Concepts, Surveys and Intentional Action.Annie Steadman & Frederick Adams - 2007 - In C. Lumer & S. Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate Publishers.
Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints.Hugh J. McCann - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1):25-36.
Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies.Hugh J. McCann - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
57 ( #201,237 of 2,517,863 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #409,482 of 2,517,863 )
2009-01-28
Total views
57 ( #201,237 of 2,517,863 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #409,482 of 2,517,863 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads