All things considered

Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):1–22 (2004)
Authors
Ruth Chang
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
One of the most common judgments of normative life takes the following form: With respect to some things that matter, one item is better than the other, with respect to other things that matter, the other item is better, but all things considered – that is, taking into account all the things that matter – the one item is better than the other. In this paper, I explore how all-things-considered judgments are possible, assuming that they are. In particular, I examine the question of how the different considerations relevant to an all-things-considered judgment come together in a way that gives each relevant consideration its proper due. I propose an answer which provides a unified account of all-things-considered judgments and highlights a deep connection between value and reason. My suggestion is that ‘all things considered’ is, in effect, a placeholder for a more comprehensive, sometimes nameless, value that includes the things considered as parts, and that this more comprehensive value determines how the things considered normatively relate.
Keywords values, axiology, reasons, all things considered, fragmentation of value  incommensurability of value, incomparability, practical reason  morality, prudence
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00018.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?Ruth Chang - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):106-126.
Feasibility in Optimizing Ethics.Geoffrey Brennan - 2013 - Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):314-329.
The Small Improvement Argument.Nicolas Espinoza - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):127 - 139.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rationalism About Obligation.David Owens - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):403-431.
The Judgment of a Weak Will.Sergio Tenenbaum - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):875-911.
Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Better Than.Stuart Rachels - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):71 – 83.
Acting Intentionally and Acting for a Reason.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):293-305.
Egoism: Arguments for and Against It From Western Philosophy.Dennis Michael Blackwood - 1995 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses.Francesco Orsi - 2008 - Etica and Politica / Ethics and Politics 10 (2):19-41.
Wrongness and Reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):137 - 152.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
1,234 ( #1,224 of 2,312,429 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
256 ( #1,133 of 2,312,429 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature