Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):731-751 (2020)
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Abstract |
A commonly-discussed feature of perceptual experience is that it has ‘assertoric’ or ‘phenomenal’ force. We will start by discussing various descriptions of the assertoricity of perceptual experience. We will then adopt a minimal characterization of assertoricity: a perceptual experience has assertoric force just in case it inclines the perceiver to believe its content. Adducing cases that show that visual experience is not always assertoric, we will argue that what renders these visual experiences non-assertoric is that they are penetrated by belief-like imaginings. Lastly, we will explain why it is that when belief-like imaginings—as opposed to beliefs (and other cognitive states)—penetrate visual experience, they render visual experiences non-assertoric.
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Keywords | perceptual assertoricity belief-like imaginings perceptual experience |
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DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2020.1751104 |
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References found in this work BETA
Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism.Fiona MacPherson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
The Epistemology of Perception.Susanna Siegel & Nicholas Silins - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience.Dustin Stokes - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92.
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