Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):731-751 (2020)

Authors
Alon Chasid
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan
Assaf Weksler
University of Haifa
Abstract
A commonly-discussed feature of perceptual experience is that it has ‘assertoric’ or ‘phenomenal’ force. We will start by discussing various descriptions of the assertoricity of perceptual experience. We will then adopt a minimal characterization of assertoricity: a perceptual experience has assertoric force just in case it inclines the perceiver to believe its content. Adducing cases that show that visual experience is not always assertoric, we will argue that what renders these visual experiences non-assertoric is that they are penetrated by belief-like imaginings. Lastly, we will explain why it is that when belief-like imaginings—as opposed to beliefs (and other cognitive states)—penetrate visual experience, they render visual experiences non-assertoric.
Keywords perceptual assertoricity  belief-like imaginings  perceptual experience
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2020.1751104
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Naïve Realism Without Disjunctivism About Experience.Matthew Conduct - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736.
Cognitive Penetration, Imagining, and the Downgrade Thesis.Lu Teng - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):405-426.
Perceptual Guidance.Sebastian Watzl - 2014 - Ratio 27 (4):414-438.
Em Defesa da Justificação Perceptiva: Desmistificando o Mito do Dado.Eros Carvalho - 2007 - Dissertation, Federal University of Minas Gerais
Perception, Generality, and Reasons.Hannah Ginsborg - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 131--57.
Is Coherentism Inconsistent?Roche William - 2011 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 33:84-90.
Is Seeing Believing?David Hilbert - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:446 - 453.
Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability.Somogy Varga - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):376-397.
Fixing Perceptual Belief.Gerald Vision - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):292-314.
Brentano on the Doxastic Nature of Perceptual Experience.Mark Textor - 2007 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 10.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-08-17

Total views
145 ( #66,689 of 2,411,736 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
33 ( #24,261 of 2,411,736 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes