Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation

Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61 (2001)
Abstract
Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes . Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no
Keywords Analysis  Conceptualism  Explanation  Metaphysics  Phenomena  Reduction  Truth
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-110-3-315
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Against Normative Naturalism.Matthew S. Bedke - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.
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