Circularity, Truth, and the Liar Paradox

Dissertation, Indiana University (1993)
Abstract
This dissertation is a study of some recent theories of truth. The theories fall into three groups: The Revision Theories, the context-sensitive theories, and the "Chrysippian theories". ;The "Chrysippian theories" are based on the intuition that pathologicalities arising from the concept of truth can be recognized and acknowledged with the concept of truth itself. Thus, from the pathologicality of the Liar, for example, we can conclude that the Liar is not true. This leads to immediate difficulties since the Liar claims just that--that it is not true--and it would thus seem to be true. The Chrysippian theories are designed to avoid these difficulties while preserving the motivating intuition. Haim Gaifman's Pointer Semantics, and Brian Skyrms' Intensional Fixed-Point Theory of Truth are examples of such theories. They are exposited and criticized. ;The context-sensitive theories dealt with are Tyler Burge's Indexical Theory of Truth and the theory of Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy. These theories claim that an ambiguity due to a contextual parameter is the reason for the difficulties we encounter. Burge offers a theory of Tarskian levels coupled with a pragmatic theory that explains the assignment of levels to occurrences of 'true'. Barwise and Etchemendy make explicit a situational parameter in their account of propositions. They consider the ambiguity with respect to the situation a propositions is about a main source of the paradoxes. ;Finally, the Revision Theories of Truth of Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap and two variations of this theory are considered. One is due to Aladdin Yaqub, the other, the "fully-varied theory", is due to Gupta and Belnap but remains largely unexplored. Revision theories are put forward as the most promising account of the difficulties. They are based on a definitional reading of all Tarski biconditionals. The circularity implied by such a reading is handled by Gupta's and Belnap's general theory of definitions. ;Yaqub's objections raised against the standard theory are examined, and his proposed solution is shown to be inadequate. The fully-varied Revision Theory is shown to provide a better solution.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,954
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Two Types of Deflationism.Aladdin Yaqub - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):77-106.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Alternative Revision Theories of Truth.André Chapuis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):399-423.
Comparing Fixed-Point and Revision Theories of Truth.Philip Kremer - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):363-403.
A Correspondence Theory of Truth.Jay Newhard - 2002 - Dissertation, Brown University
The Liar and Theories of Truth.John Hawthorn - 1983 - Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
The Paradox of Belief Instability and a Revision Theory of Belief.Byeong Lee - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):314–328.
The Nature and the Logic of Truth.Hasuk Song - 1994 - Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University
Paradox, Repetition, Revenge.Keith Simmons - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):121-131.
Presentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox. [REVIEW]Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705–712.
Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability.Kevin Scharp - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):597-645.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-02-04

Total downloads
1 ( #1,080,264 of 2,293,884 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #411,560 of 2,293,884 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes

Sign in to use this feature