Decisional Capacity and Responsibility in Addiction

In Jeffrey Poland & George Graham (eds.), Addiction and Responsibility. Cambridge, MA, USA: pp. 139-159 (2011)
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Abstract

Addiction of the variety discussed in this chapter, is a condition that by its very nature compromises decision-making capacity across the decisional spectrum. The impairment is present not only at moments of withdrawal and intoxication, but at all stages of the active addictive cycle, as long as the pathological dispositions to overvalue addictive drugs remain entrenched and operative. In light of this entrenched and pervasive reorientation in pathological values, it seems reasonable to question the unilateral presumption of capacity for cases of this sort. The reason is that there is an important, but restricted, sense in which the addicted individuals in question are not ‘responsible’ for their decisions regarding drug use. The high likelihood of relapse means that, as a clinical matter of fact, they are usually not accountable. At the same time, clinical experience also suggests that we should treat addicted individuals as if they are responsible because that empowerment is crucial to their recovery. In the end, there is probably only one safe course of action to take when faced with such a difficult situation. This is to suspend the unilateral global presumption of capacity and instead assess decision-making capacity on a case-by-case basis, with careful monitoring and encouragement.

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Louis C. Charland
PhD: University of Western Ontario

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