Fittingness Objections to Consequentialism

In Christian Seidel (ed.), Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems? Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Authors
Richard Y. Chappell
University of York
Abstract
New work in the foundations of ethics—extending the fitting attitudes analysis of value to yield a broader notion of normative fittingness as a (or perhaps even the) fundamental normative concept—provides us with the resources to clarify and renew the force of traditional character-based objections to consequentialism. According to these revamped fittingness objections, consequentialism is incompatible with plausible claims about which attitudes are truly fitting. If a theory’s implications regarding the fittingness facts are implausible, then this can be taken to cast doubt on the truth of the theory. After clarifying the general structure of fittingness objections, and establishing how they can make character-based concerns relevant to our assessment of the truth of a moral theory like consequentialism, this chapter surveys some paradigmatic fittingness objections, showing how consequentialism can be defended against them.
Keywords consequentialism  character  virtue  fittingness  utilitarianism  decision procedures  sophisticated consequentialism
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