Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence

Mind 120 (479):587-635 (2011)
Abstract
The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence : the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
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The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs.Michael Titelbaum - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):555-606.

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Metaphysical Rationalism.Shamik Dasgupta - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):379-418.
Chance and Necessity.Daniel Nolan - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):294-308.
Self‐Location and Other‐Location.Dilip Ninan - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):301-331.
Chalmers on the Objects of Credence.Jesse Fitts - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):343-358.

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