(ed.)
Harvard University Press (1997)

Abstract
Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? In this book, some of the sharpest minds in philosophy struggle with these questions.
Keywords Comparison   Reason
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Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.
Value Relations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):18-49.
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.

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