Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):115 - 137 (2004)
AbstractIn 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology' Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the primary epistemic norm of believing truths and not falsehoods. A theory of justification along these lines is then given, and its prospects of handling the evil demon objection to reliabilism are assessed
Similar books and articles
Goldman on Evidence and Reliability.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - In H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and his Critics. Blackwell.
Agent Reliabilism, Subjective Justification, and Epistemic Credit.Christine McKinnon - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):489-508.
Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (6):1317-1336.
Transglobal evidentialism-reliabilism.David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?Jack C. Lyons - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.
Two notions of the internal and Goldman's epistemic externalism.Renata Ziemińska - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):395-400.
The specificity of the generality problem.Earl Conee - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):751-762.
Reliabilism, bootstrapping, and epistemic circularity.Jochen Briesen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4361-4372.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Transmission Failure Explained.Martin Smith - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):164-189.
Is reliabilism a form of consequentialism?Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):183-194.
References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Utilitarianism: For and Against.J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams - 1973 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.