Non-Intentional Actions

American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (2):139 - 151 (1995)
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The aim of the paper is to show that there are actions which are non-intentional. An account is first given which links intentional and unintentional action to acting for a reason, or appropriate causation by an intention. Mannerisms and habitual actions are then presented as examples of behavior which are actions, but which are not done in the course of acting for a reason. This account has advantages over that of Hursthouse's "arational actions," which are allegedly intentional actions done for no reason at all. Finally, one consequence of neglecting non-intentional action is discussed to illustrate its importance.



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David K. Chan
University of Alabama, Birmingham

Citations of this work

Deliberation and Acting for Reasons.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):209-239.
Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action.Michael Brent - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):656-673.
Action Unified.Yair Levy - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):65-83.

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