On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy:1-33 (forthcoming)
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This paper argues against the view, proposed in Langland-Hassan (2020), that attitudinal imaginings are reducible to basic folk-psychological attitudes such as judgments, beliefs, desires, decisions, or combinations thereof. The proposed reduction fails because attitudinal imaginings, though similar to basic attitudes in certain respects, function differently than basic attitudes. I demonstrate this by exploring two types of cases: spontaneous imaginings, and imaginings that arise in response to fiction, showing that in these cases, imaginings cannot be identified with basic attitudes. I conclude that imagining is a distinct attitude: it enables us to freely conjure up scenarios without being bound by the restrictions that govern basic folk-psychological attitudes.



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Alon Chasid
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan

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References found in this work

Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology.Gregory Currie & Ian Ravenscroft - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Christoph Hoerl.
Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mimesis as Make-Believe.Kendall Walton - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):413-434.
Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.
Implicit bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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