Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account

Noûs 45 (4):595-639 (2011)
Authors
David Chalmers
New York University
Abstract
When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00788.x
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References found in this work BETA

Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Context and Logical Form.Jason Stanley - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (4):391--434.
Fiction and Metaphysics.Amie L. Thomasson - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Aboutness in Imagination.Franz Berto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1871-1886.
Remarks on Counterpossibles.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):639-660.
Deep Platonism.Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):307-328.
Singular Thoughts and de Re Attitude Reports.James Openshaw - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):415-437.

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