Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument

In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 269 (2004)

Authors
David Chalmers
New York University
Abstract
*[[This paper is largely based on material in other papers. The first three sections and the appendix are drawn with minor modifications from Chalmers 2002c . The main ideas of the last three sections are drawn from Chalmers 1996, 1999, and 2002a, although with considerable revision and elaboration. ]]
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References found in this work BETA

Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument.Benj Hellie - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 333.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500.
There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Knowledge-How: A Unified Account.Berit Brogaard - 2011 - In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 136-160.
The Recent Renaissance of Acquaintance.Thomas Raleigh - forthcoming - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

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