Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap

In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press (2007)
Authors
David Chalmers
New York University
Abstract
Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, there are many possible reactions. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature.
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The Evolutionary Argument for Phenomenal Powers.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives:293-316.
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
Conceiving of Pain.Brendan O'sullivan & Peter Hanks - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):351-376.
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.

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