Pictorial Experience and Intentionalism


Authors
Alon Chasid
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan
Abstract
This article examines the compatibility of intentionalism (also called ‘representationalism’) in the philosophy of perception with the thesis that we can visually experience an object by looking at a picture of that object (the pictorial experience thesis, or PET). I begin by presenting three theses associated with intentionalism and various accounts of depiction that uphold PET. Next, I show that pictures sometimes depict an object indeterminately, thereby rendering the alleged visual experience of the depicted object partly nonintentional. I then argue that if PET is true, explaining pictorial indeterminacy on intentionalist premises is problematic. I conclude that PET is incompatible with intentionalism
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1111/jaac.12106
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Twofold Pictorial Experience.René Jagnow - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.

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