Philosophical Studies 171 (3):471-491 (2014)

Authors
Alon Chasid
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan
Abstract
The central thesis (CT) that this paper upholds is that a picture depicts an object by generating in those who view the picture a visual experience of that object. I begin by presenting a brief sketch of intentionalism, the theory of perception in terms of which I propose to account for pictorial experience. I then discuss Richard Wollheim’s twofoldness thesis and explain why it should be rejected. Next, I show that the socalled unique phenomenology of pictorial experience is simply an instance of perceptual indeterminacy. Lastly, I discuss a phenomenon associated with pictures that could be considered a problem for CT, and account for it by invoking the thesis that visual experience is cognitively penetrable
Keywords Pictorial experience  Perceptual experience  Intentionalism  Indeterminacy  Cognitive penetrability
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0279-y
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References found in this work BETA

Languages of Art.Nelson Goodman - 1968 - Bobbs-Merrill.

View all 47 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?Gabriele Ferretti - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):372-393.
Why Trompe l'Oeils Deceive Our Visual Experience.Gabriele Ferretti - forthcoming - Wiley: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 78 (1).
Depicting Depictions.René Jagnow - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):453-479.
Imaginatively‐Colored Perception: Walton on Pictorial Experience.Alon Chasid - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):27-47.
Aesthetic Opacity.Emanuele Arielli - 2017 - Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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