Philosophical Issues 22 (1):106-126 (2012)

Authors
Ruth Chang
Oxford University
Abstract
This paper presents an argument against the widespread view that ‘hard choices’ are hard because of the incomparability of the alternatives. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that any plausible theory of practical reason must be ‘comparativist’ in form, that is, it must hold that a comparative relation between the alternatives with respect to what matters in the choice determines a justified choice in that situation. If comparativist views of practical reason are correct, however, the incomparabilist view of hard choices should be rejected. Incomparabilism about hard choices leads us to an implausible error theory about the phenomenology of hard choices, threatens an unattractive view of human agency, and leaves us in perplexity about what we are doing when we choose in hard choices. The second part of the argument explores the main competitor to comparativist views of practical reason, noncomparativist view, according tow which a choice is justified so long as it is not worse than any of the alternatives. This view is often assumed by rational choice theorists but has its best philosophical defense in work by Joseph Raz. On Raz’s view, incomparabilism about hard choices avoids the problems faced if comparativism is correct, but it faces different difficulties. I argue that Raz’s noncomparativist view mistakenly assimilates practical reason to more restricted normative domains such as the law.
Keywords Raz  Incomparability  Incommensurability  hard choices
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2012.00239.x
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
Value Incomparability and Incommensurability.Ruth Chang - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press.
Transformative Choices.Ruth Chang - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):237-282.
De Se Preferences and Empathy for Future Selves.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):7-39.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

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