Value Pluralism

In James Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition). Elsevier. pp. 21-26 (2015)

Authors
Ruth Chang
Oxford University
Abstract
‘Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, for example, hedonistic utilitarianism, is mistaken. The plurality of values is also thought to raise problems for rational choice. If two irreducibly distinct values conflict, it seems that there is no common ground that justifies choosing one over the other. The metaphysical plurality of values does not, however, have the implications for rational choice that many have supposed. A charitable interpretation of value pluralist writings suggests a ‘nonreductive’ form of value pluralism. Nonreductive value pluralism maintains that in the context of practical choice, there are differences between values—whether or not those values reduce to a single supervalue—that have important implications for rational choice. This article examines the main arguments for metaphysical value pluralism, argues that metaphysical value pluralism does not have certain implications that it is widely thought to have, and outlines three forms of nonreductive value pluralism.
Keywords value pluralism  value monism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Incommensurability (and Incomparability).Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell. pp. 2591-2604.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Callicott and Naess on Pluralism.Andrew Light - 1996 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273 – 294.
Monism on the One Hand, Pluralism on the Other.Matthew H. Slater - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (1):22-42.
Wittgenstein, Value Pluralism and Politics.M. J. Moore - 2010 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 36 (9):1113-1136.
Value Pluralism and Valuable Pluralism.Joaquín Jareño Alarcón - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:91-95.
Logical Pluralism and Semantic Information.Patrick Allo - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694.
Eliminative Pluralism.Marc Ereshefsky - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (4):671-690.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-10-14

Total views
653 ( #5,142 of 2,259,410 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
50 ( #14,276 of 2,259,410 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature