Realism and correspondence: reply to Arno Aurélio Viero

Manuscrito 27 (1):47-53 (2004)
Abstract
In §1 I suggest that although my theory of truth as identification is not a correspondence theory of truth in the sense of these terms used by the logical positivists, it can nevertheless be naturally interpreted as a correspondence theory of truth. In §2 I argue that whereas a correspondence theory of truth need not be a realist theory of truth, any sufficiently elaborate realist theory of truth should be interpretable as a correspondence theory of truth. I illustrate this with Frege’s denotational theory of truth
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