Reductionism about persons; and what matters

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):41-58 (1998)
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This paper's ?I examines Derek Parfit's main, metaphysical, argument for reductionism about personal identity. ?II considers three possible ethical arguments for reductionism, and suggests a new approach to the question of what matters about personal identity which has to do with the notion of an ethical narrative



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Personal Identity and Ethics.David Shoemaker - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Persons as Goods: Response to Patrick Lee.T. D. J. Chappell - 2004 - Christian Bioethics 10 (1):69-78.

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