Ramsey + Moore = God

Analysis 67 (2):170–172 (2007)
Frank Ramsey (1931) wrote: If two people are arguing 'if p will q?' and both are in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q. We can say that they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. Let us take the first sentence the way it is often taken, as proposing the following test for the acceptability of an indicative conditional: ‘If p then q’ is acceptable to a subject S iff, were S to accept p and consider q, S would accept q. Now consider an indicative conditional of the form (1) If p, then I believe p. Suppose that you accept p and consider ‘I believe p’. To accept p while rejecting ‘I believe p’ is tantamount to accepting the Moore-paradoxical sentence ‘p and I do not believe p’, and so is irrational. To accept p while suspending judgment about ‘I believe p’ is irrational for similar reasons. So rationality requires that if you accept p and consider ‘I believe p’, you accept ‘I believe p’.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00670.x
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References found in this work BETA
Review of Brian Ellis, Rational Belief Systems. [REVIEW]Bas van Fraassen - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10:497--511.

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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
Probabilities of Conditionals in Context.Justin Khoo - 2016 - Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (1):1-43.
New Surprises for the Ramsey Test.Malte Willer - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):291 - 309.

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