Noûs 53 (2):251-265 (2019)

Authors
Richard Y. Chappell
University of Miami
Abstract
Satisficing Consequentialism is often rejected as hopeless. Perhaps its greatest problem is that it risks condoning the gratuitous prevention of goodness above the baseline of what qualifies as "good enough". I propose a radical new willpower-based version of the view that avoids this problem, and that better fits with the motivation of avoiding an excessively demanding conception of morality. I further demonstrate how, by drawing on the resources of an independent theory of blameworthiness, we may obtain a principled specification of what counts as "good enough".
Keywords satisficing  willpower  consequentialism  permissibility  quality of will  blameworthiness
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Reprint years 2017, 2019
DOI 10.1111/nous.12213
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References found in this work BETA

Unprincipled Virtue.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):201-204.
Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.
Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment.Herbert A. Simon - 1956 - Psychological Review 63 (2):129-138.
Against Satisficing Consequentialism.Ben Bradley - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (2):97-108.
The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection.David Sobel - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-17.

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Citations of this work BETA

How Morality Becomes Demanding Cost Vs. Difficulty and Restriction.Marcel van Ackeren - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):315-334.

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