Noûs 53 (2):251-265 (2019)

Richard Y. Chappell
University of Miami
Satisficing Consequentialism is often rejected as hopeless. Perhaps its greatest problem is that it risks condoning the gratuitous prevention of goodness above the baseline of what qualifies as "good enough". I propose a radical new willpower-based version of the view that avoids this problem, and that better fits with the motivation of avoiding an excessively demanding conception of morality. I further demonstrate how, by drawing on the resources of an independent theory of blameworthiness, we may obtain a principled specification of what counts as "good enough".
Keywords satisficing  willpower  consequentialism  permissibility  quality of will  blameworthiness
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Reprint years 2017, 2019
DOI 10.1111/nous.12213
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

How Morality Becomes Demanding Cost Vs. Difficulty and Restriction.Marcel van Ackeren - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):315-334.
Worship and the Problem of Divine Achievement.John Pittard - 2021 - Faith and Philosophy 38 (1):65-90.
Cost and Psychological Difficulty: Two Aspects of Demandingness.Brian McElwee - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.

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