Triviality and the logic of restricted quantification

Synthese 200 (4):1-21 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper clarifies the relationship between the Triviality Results for the conditional and the Restrictor Theory of the conditional. On the understanding of Triviality proposed here, it is implausible—pace many proponents of the Restrictor Theory—that Triviality rests on a syntactic error. As argued here, Triviality arises from simply mistaking the feature a claim has when that claim is logically unacceptable for the feature a claim has when that claim is unsatisfiable. Triviality rests on a semantic confusion—one which some semantic theories, but not others, are prone to making. On the interpretation proposed here, Triviality Results thus play a theoretically constructive role in the project of natural language semantics.

Similar books and articles

Connexive Restricted Quantification.Nissim Francez - 2020 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 61 (3):383-402.
Relevant Restricted Quantification.J. C. Beall, Ross T. Brady, A. P. Hazen, Graham Priest & Greg Restall - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):587-598.
Paths to Triviality.Tore Fjetland Øgaard - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (3):237-276.
Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities without Triviality.Alexander R. Pruss - 2019 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 60 (3):551-558.
The spectre of triviality.Nate Charlow - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):595-605.
Two More Characterizations of K-Triviality.Noam Greenberg, Joseph S. Miller, Benoit Monin & Daniel Turetsky - 2018 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 59 (2):189-195.
Set theory INC# based on intuitionistic logic with restricted modus ponens rule.Jaykov Foukzon (ed.) - 2021 - AP LAMBERT Academic Publishing (June 23, 2021).
Triviality Pursuit.Alan Hájek - 2011 - Topoi 30 (1):3-15.


Added to PP

480 (#33,905)

6 months
135 (#19,820)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nate Charlow
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Context.Robert Stalnaker - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Generalized quantifiers and natural language.John Barwise & Robin Cooper - 1981 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (2):159--219.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
The theory of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.

View all 51 references / Add more references