The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief

In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to very different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like to have them. Beliefs are paradigmatically intentional, characterized by their propositional content. But there are a number of crucial points where these domains intersect. One central locus of intersection arises from the existence of phenomenal beliefs: beliefs that are about experiences

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 80,119

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Empirical content and rational constraint.Cheryl K. Chen - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):242 – 264.
Inhibiting beliefs demands attention.Kevin Barton, Jonathan Fugelsang & Daniel Smilek - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (3):250 – 267.
Phenomenal conservatism and evidentialism in religious epistemology.Chris Tucker - 2011 - In Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 52--73.
Belief and consciousness.Sara Worley - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):41-55.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
897 (#9,846)

6 months
53 (#32,632)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Chalmers
New York University

Citations of this work

The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.
Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.
Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 220 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.

View all 31 references / Add more references