Two distinctions that do make a difference: The action/omission distinction and the principle of double effect

Philosophy 77 (2):211-233 (2002)
Abstract
The paper outlines and explores a possible strategy for defending both the action/omission distinction (AOD) and the principle of double effect (PDE). The strategy is to argue that there are degrees of actionhood, and that we are in general less responsible for what has a lower degree of actionhood, because of that lower degree. Moreover, what we omit generally has a lower degree of actionhood than what we actively do, and what we do under known-but-not-intended descriptions generally has a lower degree of actionhood than what we do under known-and-intended descriptions. Therefore, we are in general less responsible for what we omit than for what we do—which is just what AOD says. And we are in general less responsible for what we do under known-but-not-intended descriptions than for what we do under known-and-intended descriptions—which is just what PDE says.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819102000256
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,224
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Is A Purely First Person Account Of Human Action Defensible?Christopher Tollefsen - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (4):441-460.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
419 ( #5,912 of 2,191,970 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #42,191 of 2,191,970 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature