Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398 (2013)

Authors
Jake Chandler
La Trobe University
Abstract
This article provides a discussion of the principle of transmission of evidential support across entailment from the perspective of belief revision theory in the AGM tradition. After outlining and briefly defending a small number of basic principles of belief change, which include a number of belief contraction analogues of the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated revision, a proposal is then made concerning the connection between evidential beliefs and belief change policies in rational agents. This proposal is found to be suffcient to establish the truth of a much-discussed intuition regarding transmission failure.
Keywords belief revision  iterated change  evidence  nontransitivity  transmission failure  Weak Ramsey Test
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9364-9
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References found in this work BETA

Facts and Certainty.Crispin Wright - 1986 - In Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 71: 1985. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press. pp. 429-472.
Knowledge in Flux.Henry E. Kyburg & Peter Gardenfors - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):519-521.

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