The nature of narrow content
Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66 (2003)
| Abstract |
A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
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| Keywords | Concept Content Intension Metaphysics Mind Narrow Twin Earth |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1533-6077.00004 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
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Citations of this work BETA
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
View all 10 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articlesWhat Narrow Content is Not.Ned Block - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
Some Content is Narrow.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly.Frederick R. Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.
Narrow Content Functionalism and the Mind-Body Problem.Kenneth A. Taylor - 1989 - Noûs 23 (3):355-72.
Narrow Content.Robert Stalnaker - 1990 - In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: Csli.
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