The nature of narrow content

Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66 (2003)
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Abstract

A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..

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David Chalmers
New York University

Citations of this work

Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
Talk and Thought.Sarah Sawyer - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 379-395.
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
Atomism, pluralism, and conceptual content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.

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