The nature of narrow content

Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66 (2003)
Authors
David Chalmers
New York University
Abstract
A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
Keywords Concept  Content  Intension  Metaphysics  Mind  Narrow  Twin Earth
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DOI 10.1111/1533-6077.00004
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.

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Citations of this work BETA

Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
Real Narrow Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):304–328.
Subjective Externalism.Sarah Sawyer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (1):4-22.

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