The nature of epistemic space

In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press (2011)
Authors
David Chalmers
New York University
Abstract
A natural way to think about epistemic possibility is as follows. When it is epistemically possible (for a subject) that p, there is an epistemically possible scenario (for that subject) in which p. The epistemic scenarios together constitute epistemic space. It is surprisingly difficult to make the intuitive picture precise. What sort of possibilities are we dealing with here? In particular, what is a scenario? And what is the relationship between scenarios and items of knowledge and belief? This chapter tries to make sense of epistemic space. It explores different ways of making sense of scenarios and of their relationship to thought and language. It discusses some issues that arise and outlines some applications to the analysis of the content of thought and the meaning of language.
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On Counterpossibles.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (2):1-27.
The Content of Deduction.Mark Jago - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):317-334.

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