Very few (if any) people believe that the world was created, and is maintained, by a thoroughly contemptible and malicious being. Do we have good reason for our disbelief? In the first part of this paper I offer an argument for the non-existence of such a being. According to this argument there is just too much good - too may good things - in the world for the ‘malicious being’ theory to be plausible. In the second part of the paper I briefly consider the applicability of similar arguments to three other possible beings.
|Keywords||The Existence of a vile creator Goodness in the world|
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