The possibility of parity

Ethics 112 (4):659-688 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper argues for the existence of a fourth positive generic value relation that can hold between two items beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’: namely ‘on a par’.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
1,532 (#7,019)

6 months
231 (#10,999)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ruth Chang
Oxford University

References found in this work

Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts.W. B. Gallie - 1956 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1):167-198.
A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity.Larry S. Temkin - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (3):175-210.
The puzzle of the self-torturer.Warren S. Quinn - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (1):79-90.

View all 8 references / Add more references