The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism

In Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press (2009)
Abstract
A number of popular arguments for dualism start from a premise about an epistemic gap between physical truths about truths about consciousness, and infer an ontological gap between physical processes and consciousness. Arguments of this sort include the conceivability argument, the knowledge argument, the explanatory-gap argument, and the property dualism argument. Such arguments are often resisted on the grounds that epistemic premises do not entail ontological conclusion. My view is that one can legitimately infer ontological conclusions from epistemic premises, if one is very careful about how one reasons. To do so, the best way is to reason first from epistemic premises to modal conclusions , and from there to ontological conclusions. Here, the crucial issue is the link between the epistemic and modal domains. How can one reason from theses about what is knowable or conceivable to theses about what is necessary or possible? To bridge the epistemic and modal domains, the framework of two-dimensional semantics can play a central role. I have used this framework in earlier work to mount an argument against materialism. Here, I want to revisit the argument, laying it out in a more explicit and careful form, and responding to a number of objections. In what follows I will concentrate mostly on the conceivability argument. I think that very similar considerations apply to the other arguments mentioned above, however. In the final section of the paper, I show how this analysis might yield a unified treatment of a number of anti-materialist arguments
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,440
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
A Defence of the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts.Jussi Haukioja - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):145 - 151.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Redundancy of the Zombie Argument in The Conscious Mind.Antti Heikinheimo - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):5-6.
Evidentialism and Skeptical Arguments.Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):337-352.
Faith and the Existence of God: R. G. Swinburne.R. G. Swinburne - 1988 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 24:121-143.
The Possibility of Inductive Moral Arguments.Mark T. Nelson - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (2):231-246.
On the PROVER9 Ontological Argument.T. Parent - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):475-483.
Turning the Zombie on its Head.Amir Horowitz - 2009 - Synthese 170 (1):191 - 210.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
771 ( #1,319 of 2,180,202 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #9,190 of 2,180,202 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums