Abstract

This thesis considers Bernard Williams's critique of moral philosophy. ;First, I examine Williams's claim that there are no ethical theories which can provide an objective grounding or foundation for ethics. I focus on his discussion of ethical realism and ethical naturalism. Ethical realism holds that the objective foundation of ethical truths and knowledge rests on their mirroring or representing an ethical reality independent of us. Whereas ethical naturalism holds that ethical truths and knowledge are embedded in forms of ethical life which can be objectively grounded on the basis of considerations of human nature and human well-being or flourishing. ;Second, I investigate Williams's repudiation of the obligation-centred morality. Williams complains that the moral conception of obligation is unduly demanding: it has a structure of general and indeterminate obligations whose observance can come to dominate the moral agent's life altogether; and it unwarrantedly sees its demands as above the claims of other nonmoral values or, more generally, human needs and projects. Williams also disparages morality's treatment of moral conflict as too insubstantial; morality's denial of conflict of obligations leaves the moral agent unable to account coherently for some common responses to moral conflict resolution such as regret, reparation, and other related considerations. ;Third, I discuss Williams's internalism, which holds that all reasons for action, including moral ones, are internal or relative to the present desires or, more generally, the evaluative dispositions of the agent. Williams argues that if a moral reason statement fails to appeal to an agent's present desires or, more generally, evaluative dispositions, then, the statement is false. ;The core contention of my thesis is that these arguments are unpersuasive