AbstractZombies are hypothetical creatures of the sort that philosophers have been known to cherish. A zombie is physically identical to a normal human being, but completely lacks conscious experience. Zombies look and behave like the conscious beings that we know and love, but "all is dark inside." There is nothing it is like to be a zombie.
Similar books and articles
Zombies from Below.David Robb - 2008 - In Simone Gozzano Francesco Orilia (ed.), Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology. Ontos Verlag.
Zombie killer.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 1998 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Ii. MIT Press.
Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear from Ghosts than Zombies.Philip Goff - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):119-139.
The inaugural address: Why there couldn't be zombies.Robert Kirk - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):1–16.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
No citations found.
References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.Paul M. Churchland - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.Paul M. Churchland (ed.) - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.