Philosophy of Science 48 (2):248-268 (1981)

A philosophically important but largely overlooked cognitive theory is examined, one that provides information on which inferences an agent will make from his beliefs. Such a theory of feasible inferences is indispensable in a complete cognitive psychology, in particular, for predicting the agent's actions on the basis of rationality conditions and attributed beliefs and desires. However, very little of the feasibility theory which applies to a typical human being can be shown a priori to apply to all agents. The logical competence required of a rational agent seems to have a cluster structure: it cannot be the case that an agent is able to make no inferences, but an agent can be unable to make any particular one
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DOI 10.1086/288995
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Rationality and Psychological Explanation.John Heil - 1985 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 28 (1-4):359 – 371.

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