Intentionalism and the Problem of the Content of Perception

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72 (2-3):519-530 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper I will discuss the intentionalist view of perception, and present some arguments to support the view that, contrary to Michael Martin’s criticism, intentionalists do not need to conceive the content of perception as either singular or general, because this is not the way that it should be thought. The right way to conceive the representational content of perception is by considering it as informational and functional.

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10.17990/rpf/2016_72_2_0519

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Karla Chediak
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PhD)

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