Machines as Persons?

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 29:11-24 (1991)
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Abstract

I begin, as I shall end, with fictions.In a well-known tale, The Sandman, Hoffmann has a student, Nathaniel, fall in love with a beautiful doll, Olympia, whom he has spied upon as she sits at a window across the street from his lodgings. We are meant to suppose that Nathaniel mistakes an automaton for a human being. The mistake is the result of an elaborate but obscure deception on the part of the doll's designer, Professor Spalanzani. Nathaniel is disabused quite by accident when he over-hears a quarrel between Spalanzani, who made Olympia's clockwork, and the sinister Coppelius, who contributed the eyes.

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Citations of this work

Why machines cannot be moral.Robert Sparrow - 2021 - AI and Society (3):685-693.
Machines as Persons?Oswald Hanfling - 1991 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 29:25-34.

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References found in this work

Zettel.J. E. Llewelyn - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 18 (71):176-177.
When is Fantasising Morally Bad?Christopher Cherry - 1988 - Philosophical Investigations 11 (2):112-132.
The possibility of computers becoming persons.R. G. A. Dolby - 1989 - Social Epistemology 3 (4):321 – 336.

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