Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):249 – 265 (2006)

Authors
Charles R. Pigden
University of Otago
Abstract
According to the truthmaker theory that we favour, all contingent truths are made true by existing facts or states of affairs. But if that is so, then it appears that we must accept the existence of the negative facts that are required to make negative truths (such as 'There is no hippopotamus in the room.') true. We deny the existence of negative facts, show how negative truths are made true by positive facts, point out where the (reluctant) advocates of negative facts (Russell, Armstrong, et al.) went wrong, and demonstrate the superiority of our solution to the alternatives.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400600759092
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Philosophy 79 (309):491-494.
Universals and Scientific Realism.D. M. Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Grounding Nonexistence.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):209-229.
Priority Monism, Partiality, and Minimal Truthmakers.A. R. J. Fisher - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):477-491.
Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology1: Ross P. Cameron.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62:107-128.
An Argument for Minimal Logic.Nils Kürbis - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):31-63.
The Hard Road to Presentism.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):314-335.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

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