Pythagorean Powers


The Quine/Putnam indispensability argument is regarded by many as the chief argument for the existence of platonic objects. We argue that this argument cannot establish what its proponents intend. The form of our argument is simple. Suppose indispensability to science is the only good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects. Either the dispensability of mathematical objects to science can be demonstrated and, hence, there is no good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects, or their dispensability cannot be demonstrated and, hence, there is no good reason for believing in the existence of mathematical objects which are genuinely platonic. Therefore, indispensability, whether true or false, does not support platonism. Mathematical platonists claim that at least some of the objects which are the subject matter of pure mathematics (e.g. numbers, sets, groups) actually exist. Furthermore, they claim that these objects differ radically from the concrete objects (trees, cats, stars, molecules) which inhabit the material world. We take the standard platonistic position to include the claim that platonic objects lack spatio-temporal location and causal powers. Many (perhaps most) mathematical platonists subscribe to this view.1 But some who call themselves (or might be called) mathematical platonists..



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References found in this work

Mathematical Truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Philosophy of Logic.Hilary Putnam - 1971 - London: Allen & Unwin.
Philosophy of Logic.Hilary Putnam - 1971 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
Conservativeness and Incompleteness.Stewart Shapiro - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (9):521-531.
Nominalism and the Contingency of Abstract Objects.Crispin Wright & Bob Hale - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):111-135.

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