Philosophia Mathematica 7 (2):164-177 (1999)
According to standard mathematical platonism, mathematical entities (numbers, sets, etc.) are abstract entities. As such, they lack causal powers and spatio-temporal location. Platonists owe us an account of how we acquire knowledge of this inaccessible mathematical realm. Some recent versions of mathematical platonism postulate a plenitude of mathematical entities, and Mark Balaguer has argued that, given the existence of such a plenitude, the attainment of mathematical knowledge is rendered non-problematic. I assess his epistemology for such a profligate platonism and find it unsatisfactory because it lacks an adequate semantics, in particular, an adequate account of reference.
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