Philosophy of Science 60 (2):349-357 (1993)

Schwartz (1991) argues that the worry that successful reduction would eliminate rather than conserve the mental is a needless worry. He examines cases of reduction from the natural sciences and claims that if reduction of the mental is like any of those cases then it would not be a case of elimination. I discuss other cases of scientific reduction which do involve elimination. Schwartz has not shown that reduction of the mental could not be like such cases, so his argument is not sufficient to dispel the worry of elimination.
Keywords Empiricism  Epistemology  Folk Psychology  Mental  Semantics  Schwartz, J
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/289738
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,086
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
66 ( #143,012 of 2,344,621 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #513,543 of 2,344,621 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes