Self-Defeating Beliefs and Misleading Reasons

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):57-72 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


We have no reason to believe that reasons do not exist. Contra Bart Streumer’s recent proposal, this has nothing to do with our incapacity to believe this error theory. Rather, it is because if we know that if a proposition is true, we have no reason to believe it, then we have no reason to believe this proposition. From a different angle: if we know that we have at best misleading reasons to believe a proposition, then we have no reason to believe it. This has two consequences. Firstly, coming close to believing the error theory is idle or pointless. Secondly, philosophers who argue that believing sweeping theories like determinism or physicalism is self-defeating because they are either false or believed for no reason pursue a worthwhile argumentative strategy.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,635

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Defeating Looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2985-3012.
Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?John Broome - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):349-374.
Self-Defeating Self-Governance.Chrisoula Andreou - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):20-34.
Is Relativism Self-Defeating?Harold Zellner - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:287-295.
“Is Relativism Self-Defeating?”.Harold Zellner - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:287-295.
Belief for Someone Else’s Sake.Simon Keller - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):19-35.
Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Alex Gregory - 2017 - In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-217.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.


Added to PP

56 (#209,140)

6 months
3 (#211,336)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette
Université de Neuchâtel

Citations of this work

Is Free Will Scepticism Self-Defeating?Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):55-78.
Sceptical Deliberations.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):383-408.
Knowing About Responsibility.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3):201-216.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Justice for Hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.

View all 42 references / Add more references