Sceptical Deliberations


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Abstract
Suppose I am a leeway sceptic: I think that, whenever I face a choice between two courses of action, I lack true alternatives. Can my practical deliberation be rational? Call this the Deliberation Question. This paper has three aims in tackling it. Its constructive aim is to provide a unified account of practical deliberation. Its corrective aim is to amend the way that philosophers have recently framed the Deliberation Question. Finally, its disputative aim is to argue that leeway sceptics cannot deliberate entirely rationally about what to do, because of the connection between deliberating and deciding.
Keywords Practical deliberation  Provisions  Decisions  Rationality  Deliberation incompatibilism
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