The Situational Structure of Primate Beliefs

Abstract
This paper develops the situational model of primate beliefs from the Prior-Lurz line of thought. There is a strong skepticism concerning primate beliefs in the analytic tradition which holds that beliefs have to be propositional and non-human animals do not have them (e.g., Davidson 1975, 1982). The response offered in this paper is twofold. First, two arguments against the propositional model as applied to other animals are put forward: an a priori argument from referential opacity and an empirical argument from varieties of working memory. Second, the Prior-Lurz situational model based on state of affairs as opposed to propositions is introduced and defended with two significant modifications. With this model of primate beliefs we can make progress in understanding how other primates can have certain mindreading capacity.
Keywords Beliefs  Primates  Mindreading  Situational Structure  State of Affairs
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1515/pipjp-2016-0006
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Structural Justification.Robert Audi - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:473-492.
Non-Interpretative Metacognition for True Beliefs.Ori Friedman & Adam R. Petrashek - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):146-147.
Consistency of Belief.Howard Darmstadter - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (10):301-310.
Three Descriptive Models of Social Structure.Philip K. Bock - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (2):168-174.
Hearts of Darkness: 'Perpetrator History' and Why There is No Why.Paul Roth - 2004 - History of the Human Sciences 17 (2-3):211-251.
Without Pretense: A Critique of Goldman’s Model of Simulation.Uku Tooming - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):561-575.
Methodologische Überlegungen zu tierischen Überzeugungen / Methodological Reflections on Exploring Beliefs in Animals.Manuel Bremer - 2007 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):347 - 355.
O uzasadnieniach przekonań religijnych.Józef Herbut - 2008 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 56 (2):71-82.
A Quantitative Analysis of Modal Logic.Ronald Fagin - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (1):209-252.
An Argument for Scepticism Concerning Justified Beliefs.I. T. Oakley - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (3):221 - 228.
Situational Logic and Covering Law Explanations in History.Michael Martin - 1968 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-4):388 – 399.
Methodologische Überlegungen Zu Tierischen Überzeugungen.Manuel Bremer - 2007 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):347-355.
Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time.Darren Bradley - 2013 - In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago.
Added to PP index
2016-11-10

Total downloads
38 ( #156,108 of 2,235,800 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #39,112 of 2,235,800 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature