Abstract

Moral ‘saints and heroes’ are generally considered to be admirable, moral exemplars worthy of emulation. J. O. Urmson characterizes them as morally laudable agents who perform supererogatory actions. This characterization, combined with relevant empirical evidence, presents a paradox in which supererogatory acts appear to become, not optional, but obligatory for moral saints and heroes. This is termed the ‘agent–observer disparity’. Drawing on Bernard Williams’ ideas, the concepts of practical necessity and moral incapacity, which are expressive of and grounded in one’s character, are utilized to account for moral saints and heroes’ subjective morality and illuminate their exceptional strength of character. In response to misgivings regarding the imitability of moral saints and heroes and the attainability of their excellences of character, this study suggests that the considerable gap between the characteristics of extreme exemplars and ordinary individuals can provide ordinary individuals with the freedom to consider the moral perspectives of these exemplars that evoke wonder without the exemplars’ actions becoming a threat to ordinary people’s self-concept. The earnest aspiration to reach the moral ideals of moral saints and heroes can move ordinary individuals and trigger an aretaic impulse to act more virtuously without causing stress. It is concluded that moral saints and heroes as extreme exemplars complement the influence of ordinary ‘close-by’ moral mentors and both are key in exemplar-based character education.