Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (1994)

Authors
William Child
Oxford University
Abstract
Philosophers of mind have long been interested in the relation between two ideas: that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do. Many have thought that those ideas are incompatible. William Child argues that there is in fact no tension between them, and that we should accept both. He shows how we can have a causal understanding of the mental without having to see attitudes and experiences as internal, causally interacting entities and he defends this view against influential objections. The book offers detailed discussions of many of Donald Davidson's contributions to the philosophy of mind, and also considers the work of Dennett, Anscombe, McDowell, and Rorty, among others. Issues discussed include: the nature of intentional phenomena; causal explanation; the character of visual experience; psychological explanation; and the causal relevance of mental properties.
Keywords Philosophy of mind  Causation  Interpretation (Philosophy
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Reprint years 1996
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Call number BD418.3.C455 1994
ISBN(s) 0198236255   9780198236252   0198239785
DOI 10.1016/0191-6599(95)90249-x
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The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
Either / Or.Alex Byrne & Heather Logue - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 314-19.
Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness?Alva Noë & Evan Thompson - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.
The Object View of Perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):215-227.

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