Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness as an Integrated Information Theorist

Foundations of Science 1 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this paper we provide a philosophical analysis of the Hard Problem of consciousness and the implications of conceivability scenarios for current neuroscientific research. In particular, we focus on one of the most prominent neuroscientific theories of consciousness, integrated information theory. After a brief introduction on IIT, we present Chalmers’ original formulation and propose our own layered view of the hard problem, showing how 2 separate issues can be distinguished. More specifically, we argue that it’s possible to disentangle a core problem of consciousness from a layered hard problem, the latter being essentially connected to Chalmers’ conceivability argument. We then assess the relation between the Hard Problem and IIT, showing how the theory resists conceivability scenarios, and how it is equipped to face up to the hard problem in its broadest acceptation.

Similar books and articles

Does Integrated Information Lack Subjectivity.Janko Nešić - 2018 - Theoria: Beograd 61 (2):131-145.
The Problem with the 'Information' in Integrated Information Theory.Garrett Mindt - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (7-8):130-154.
Illusionist Integrated Information Theory.K. J. McQueen - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):141-169.
Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness.Fallon Francis - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Four Conceptions of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Jonathan Eric Dorsey - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):129-44.
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Is Consciousness Intrinsic?: A Problem for the Integrated Information Theory.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30).
Giving Up on the Hard Problem of Consciousness. E. Mills - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):26-32.


Added to PP

72 (#165,233)

6 months
27 (#39,519)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Robert Chis-Ciure
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Francesco Ellia
University of Bologna

References found in this work

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.

View all 21 references / Add more references